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through the lens of a general equilibrium assessment:
The case of oil-exporting countries
The compensation of developing countries for the adverse impacts of climate change and climate policies is one of the constant stumbling blocks of international climate negotiations.
These adverse impacts encompass three distinct issues: climate change damages, higher energy prices affecting households' purchase power and firms' production costs and the reduction of exportation revenues in fossil fuel producing economies. Historically, it is under pressure of Middle-East countries and the Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) that these concerns have been officially acknowledged at different stages of international negotiations, since article 4.8 of the UNFCCC 1 and article 3.14 of the Kyoto protocol 2 (Barnett and Dessai, 2002) This repetition is the sign that no tangible progress could be made about this sticking point of climate negotiations in the past decades. This impasse has obvious political roots, i.e. the reluctance of developed countries to grant large transfers towards countries perceived as rent seekers, especially in a context of public budget constraint. But, beyond this political dimension, compensations based on monetary transfers raise questions about both their amount and their efficiency for sustaining economic activity in a general equilibrium vision.
This paper tries and frames these two sides of the compensation problem.
The first question relates to the evaluation of climate policy losses in oil-exporting countries, which defines the compensations but remains a controversial topic in the literature. General equilibrium energy-economy models predict significant costs 4 whereas dynamic partial equilibrium models find moderate losses 5 . These opposite conclusions are related to the assumptions underlying the two approaches. The former conventionally assumes optimized trajectories under perfect foresight and flexible technical and market adjustments, which comes down to overlooking the potential co-benefits of climate policies permitted by the correction of baseline sub-optimalities. The latter do not consider the feedback effects of the oil sector on macroeconomic indicators and hence do not account for the reduction of world oil demand under climate policy, a potentially major adverse impact on oil-exporting economies. One ambition of this paper is thus to provide a comprehensive assessment of the cost of climate policy in oil-exporting countries through a combination of these two approaches, i.e. in a hybrid top-down/bottom-up framework (Hourcade et al, 2006) .
The second question relates to the effect of monetary transfers on economic activity and welfare in the recipient country, which has been investigated in a large body of literature on the empirics of "development aid and growth". A recent survey by (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2011) shows however that no univocal message can be derived from existing assessments. Some support the idea that development aid promotes growth, 6 whereas others find it growth-neutral 7 or even contributing to depress activity through indirect mechanisms undermining aid effectiveness (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005) . Among these, (Rajan and Subramanian, 2011) typically demonstrate the role of real exchange rate overvaluation when trade effects and structural lock-ins are accounted for. This mechanism is a source of the 'natural resource curse' through its negative effect on local competitiveness and socioeconomic development (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 2001; Frankel, 2010; Ross, 2012 
Modelling long-term oil markets in a globalized economy
This paper adopts the IMACLIM-R model, which has been developed for the analysis of energy and climate issues at a long-term horizon, and this section summarizes its specificities that are of particular importance for the topics of this paper. The static equilibrium represents short-run macroeconomic interactions at each date t under technology and capacity constraints. It is calculated assuming Leontief production functions with fixed intermediate consumption, labour inputs and mark-up in non-energy sectors 9 .
Households maximize their utility through a tradeoff between consumption goods, mobility services and residential energy uses considering fixed end-use equipment. Market clearing conditions lead to a partial utilization of production capacities, given the fixed mark-up pricing and the stickiness of labour markets. This equilibrium provides a snapshot of the economy at date t in terms of relative prices, wages, employment, production levels and trade flows.
The dynamic modules are reduced forms of bottom-up models, which describe the evolution of structural and technical parameters between t and t+1 in response to past and current economic signals. At each year, regional capital accumulation is given by firms' investment, households' savings, and international capital flows. On that basis, the across-sector distribution of investments is governed by expectations on sector profitability and technical conditions as described in sector-specific reduced forms of technology-rich models (referred to as Nexus modules and described in details in the Supplementary Material of (Waisman et This structure comes to adopt a standard putty-clay representation with fixed technical content of installed capital, which allows distinguishing between short-term rigidities and long-term flexibilities (Johansen, 1959) . 10 The consistency of the iteration between the static equilibrium and dynamic modules relies on 'hybrid matrices', which ensure an explicit representation of the material and technical content of production processes through a description of the economy in consistent money values and physical quantities (Sands et al., 2005) . In this multisectoral framework with partial use of production factors, market imperfections and adaptive expectations, growth patterns may endogenously depart from the natural rate given by exogenous assumptions on active population and labour productivity (Phelps, 1961) .
Description of oil markets
The description of oil supply in the IMACLIM-R model captures three crucial determinants of oil exploitation at different time horizons (Rehrl and Friedrich, 2006 ):
• heterogeneous (conventional and non-conventional) oil reserves distinguished by their exploitation cost, expressed in dollars per barrel ($/bbl);
• geological constraints limiting the short-term adaptability of oil supply and its long-term availability;
• the market power of Middle-East countries and their ability to influence world oil prices through their production decisions.
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In addition, macroeconomic interplays in IMACLIM-R include lessons from econometric studies on the macroeconomic effects of the first oil shock (Hamilton, 2008) . We incorporate five model specifications that have been proven as necessary to reproduce the observed magnitudes of macroeconomic effects consecutive to oil price variations:
• mark-up pricing to capture market imperfections (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1996) ;
• partial utilization rate of capital due to limits in the substitution between capital and energy (Finn, 2000) ;
• a putty-clay description of technologies to represent the inertias of capital stock (Atkeson and Kehoe, 1999) ;
• frictions in the reallocation of capital across heterogeneous sectors causing differentiated levels of idle production capacities (Bresnahan and Ramey, 1993) ;
• frictions in the reallocation of labor across heterogeneous sectors causing differentiated levels of unemployment (Davis and Haltiwanger, 2001 ).
The empirical evidence behind these two groups of model specifications and the implementation of these principles into the IMACLIM-R are more extensively discussed in (Waisman et al, 2012b ).
Specifications for international trade
In IMACLIM-R, all intermediate and final goods are internationally tradable and total demand for each good is satisfied by a mix of domestic production and imports. Energy flows are represented in physical quantities whereas all other goods are described with Armington specifications to capture imperfect substitutability among goods produced in different regions (Armington, 1969) . Domestic as well as international markets for all goods are cleared (i.e. no stock is allowed) by a unique set of endogenous relative prices (the 'terms-of-trade'), which adjust to maintain the equilibrium of the balance of payments defined by the sum of trade flows and capital flows.
The endogenization of capital flows has hardly been operationalized in global-scale energyeconomy models (a notable exception being (McKibbin et al., 1999) ) because of a lack of shared empirical evidence 12 and unresolved controversies in the economic literature about capital mobility 13 . This is why we resort to exogenous assumptions on the dynamics of capital flows, defined by the net balance between capital exports and imports, including the return to foreign direct investments. Base year imbalances on capital flows are explicitly represented through the calibration of capital imports/exports observed in 2001 and their dynamics is governed by an exponential decrease representing a progressive correction of international capital imbalances by 2050.
The climate policy in IMACLIM-R
A climate policy in the IMACLIM-R model is defined by an exogenous carbon emission profile which defines, at each date, the maximum level of carbon emissions from the production and use of fossil energies (coal, oil and gas) in final goods and in transformation processes. When this maximum is binding (i.e., allowed emissions are lower than in the baseline), a carbon price is introduced: at each date, its level is endogenously calculated so that the increase in the cost of fossil energies triggers a decrease of their use consistent with the climate constraint.
Associated revenues are collected by the government which then reallocates them to households and/or firms through transfers. When considering international climate regimes, international permit market can be modeled by defining regional allocations and introducing transfers according to the difference between these and real emissions.
Oil markets and the costs of climate policy
In this section, we consider the 'ideal' case of a world agreement on a Kyoto-type climate architecture with full participation, including the free compliance of Middle-East countries 14 .
Although this assumption may seem unrealistic, this scenario defines a useful benchmark to assess the adverse impacts of a climate policy on major oil producers.
For the sake of comparability of the results, we consider a unique climate objective throughout the paper, defined by a stabilization of CO2 atmospheric concentration at 450 ppm (parts per million). This target limits the temperature increase to +3°C, which seems more realistic than the +2°C objective conventionally put forward in climate negotiations, and comes down to imposing a peak of world CO 2 emissions between 2010 and 2020 and a decrease by 30% in 2050 with respect to 2000 levels (Barker et al., 2007, Table TS2 For the sake of simplicity, we assume common assumptions on all the technical and behavioral determinants of energy-economy trajectories, but sensitivity of model outcomes to these assumptions are studied in other specific papers 16 . The only variant concerns oil price trajectories, about which the literature on the strategic response of OPEC to various profiles of carbon prices often concludes that major oil producers would adopt a limited deployment of production capacities (IPCC, 2001, section 8.3.2.3) . The rationale behind such behavior is to cut back production to trigger price increases and hence maintain revenues despite the drop of oil consumption (e.g., Berg and al., 1997b) . However, low short-term oil prices may also have some advantages in a climate policy context by simultaneously accelerating short-term oil consumption and limiting the incentive for oil-free technical change to sustain long-term oil demand. This is why we consider two oil pricing trajectories mimicking alternative reactions of Middle-East producers:
-
The Limited Deployment scenario (LD):
Middle-East producers refrain from investing in new capacity and maintain the medium term oil price around p high =90$/bbl. This scenario follows the standard conclusion of high prices permitting to extract oil rents as soon as possible before the climate policy reduces significantly oil demand.
The Market Flooding scenario (MF):
Middle-East producers expand their production capacities and bring the oil price back to its pre-2004 level, p low = 50$/bbl. This strategy is an example of the "green paradox", according to which the introduction of a climate policy is an incentive for oil producers to accelerate the extraction of resources (Sinn, 2008) 
Carbon pricing and oil markets under climate policy
The carbon price follows a similar trajectory under the two oil pricing strategies, with three distinct periods (Figure 3a) . Although the MF scenario confronts a depressing effect on oil prices and short-term oil rents, Middle-East countries may find a rationale for adopting this strategy in a climate policy context. In particular, maintaining low oil prices like in the MF scenario helps oil exporters to protect the oil share in energy markets under a climate policy, by redirecting the mitigation efforts towards a more intense reduction of coal. Indeed, in the MF scenario, consumer oil prices (including the carbon tax) are lower than in the LD scenario during almost all the period (Figure 3d ), and world oil demand proves to be higher over the whole period 2010-2050, with a significant cumulative difference amounting to 94 Billion bbl (12.9 GToe). Table   1 shows a similar effect for gas (19% higher cumulated gas consumption in the MF scenario)
because of the indexation of gas prices on oil prices when they remain sufficiently low. Given the identical climate objectives forcing identical carbon emissions in total the higher oil and gas consumption under MF scenario must be offset by lower coal production (12% less cumulative production over . Although the numerical differences are moderate in terms of cumulated production, the next section will show that this will have significant impacts on exportation revenues over the period. In the short-term, as discussed in section 2.1, price levels are almost unaffected by the climate policy and the reduction of oil exportation revenues is due to the drop of oil demand. In the longer term, price effects enter into play and magnify the revenue losses, especially in the MF scenario where costs reach $10 700 Billion over the whole period, or 26% of cumulated oil revenues,. This is because the climate policy delays Peak Oil and minors its consequences in terms of rising prices, hence strongly limiting the high long-term profits Middle-East countries receive in the baseline case. This effect is also at play under the Low Deployment scenario but with a lower magnitude so that cumulative losses are limited to $6 000 Billion over 2010-2050, or 16% of total oil revenues. 
Middle-East GDP variations under climate policy
Less intuitive is the somewhat different picture obtained by observing the macroeconomic losses in Middle-East countries ( Figure 5 ).
Over the short-term (2010-2020), the contraction of economic activity reaches a very significant 12.5% losses, which corresponds to an average 1% reduction of growth rates over 2010-2020 (3.5% instead of 4.5%). This is due to the sharply upward-oriented carbon prices at this time horizon and to inertias on the renewal of technologies and end-use equipment which inhibit the capacity of producers and consumers to escape the increase of their energy bill. These effects cause significant increases of production costs and final prices undermining competitiveness of non-energy sectors and consumers' purchase power. Those effects combine to generate a drop in final demand, a contraction of production, higher unemployment and an additional weakening of households' purchase power. Although valid for any region, these mechanisms are particularly important in Middle-East countries because of the high fossil-intensity of production process driving high energy costs (especially when compared with labour costs), and of the high share of energy expenditures in households' budget.
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Over the long run, despite the permanent gap in oil revenues, macroeconomic activity experiences a recovery phase and GDP levels in 2050 are very close to baseline levels (only 1% and 3% losses under MF and LD scenarios, respectively). This means that a drop of oil revenues as experienced under a climate policy is not necessarily univocally penalizing for economic activity. This can be analysed as the end of the 'natural resource curse' (Sachs and Warner, 2001) . In the present case of an exogenous assumption about the current account balance, lower oil exportation revenues imply a lower exchange rate of local currencies favoring the competitiveness of domestic industries. The climate policy then fosters local production at the expense of industrial goods importation and induces a faster industrialization in Middle-East countries which better prepares Middle-East's economies to the post oil era. Long-run economic activity is less sensitive to oil revenues and those revenues fall into a more mature production structure apt to absorb them efficiently. This is critically illustrated by the MF scenario, in which almost the same GDP levels are reached in 2050 despite 25% lower oil revenues at that time horizon. , where R ∆ and CVI are the effective and compensative variation of income respectively. This indicator is commonly admitted as a better indicator than GDP in the context of important changes of the structure of prices because it accounts for the policy effects on households given their consumption preferences and constraints (see the survey on the decomposition of welfare effects in CGE models in (Gohin, 2005) and the applications to the context of climate change in (Bernard and Vielle, 2003 ))
The general surplus trend is similar to GDP variations with important losses in the short-term and a long-term partial recovery. But, contrary to GDP trends, the magnitude of the effects is notably different in function of the pricing scenario. This is particularly true in the short-term where welfare losses are amplified under MF scenario (up to 18%). In this case indeed, the introduction of a carbon price has an important effect on end-use energy prices compared to a low baseline oil price. Therefore, it undermines more households' purchase power. At a longer term horizon, the recovery of surplus levels proves to be less important than the recovery of GDP: surplus levels are still around 5% lower than in the baseline in 2050. Again, the inertias limiting the changes of consumption patterns hamper the reduction of oil-intensity for final demand. In particular, constrained mobility needs for daily travels (essentially, commuting and shopping) force the consumption of fossil fuels without increasing welfare levels.
Climate policy and Monetary Compensations (MC) for oil producers:
framing the debate.
The previous section has demonstrated that, although the costs of the climate policy are significantly reduced when considering economic activity instead of oil revenues, macroeconomic assessments still feature a risk of high costs in Middle-East economies, especially in the transitory period. This assessment confirms the intuition that the international community will have to think of complementary measures to limit the adverse impacts of climate policies to gain the compliance of major oil-exporting economies. We consider now the simplest of such measure, i.e. the implementation of Monetary Compensations (hereafter denoted as MC) for which two rationales can be envisaged. Their amount and time-profile can be calculated to compensate either the losses of oil exportation revenues (sectoral MC) or the drop of economic activity (macroeconomic MC) ( Figure 7 ). The first option compensates the drop of exportation revenues due to the climate policy (dotted lines in Figure 7 ). To appreciate whether such transfers could be acceptable, we compare them with total North-South transfers for development aid as a point of comparison to appraise their acceptability in contributing countries. Considering the orders of magnitude, it is sufficient to observe that, the transfers would be close or even exceed 0.7% of GDP that is set as the UN target for global development aid for Middle-East only (diamond points in Figure 7 ). This shows that the compensation of exportation losses is highly unlikely for political reasons all the more so as they remain relatively low in the short-term when the core of macroeconomic losses is experienced.
For these reasons, we exclude this type of compensations to consider instead that the transfers should compensate economic activity losses, measured by the reduction of Middle-East's GDP (solid lines in Figure 7 ). They still represent a relatively important amount (around 0.24% of OECD GDP on average over 2010-2050 in both scenarios), but they always remain well below the 0.7% benchmark. In IMACLIM-R, those transfers are taken from OECD 
The macroeconomy of monetary transfers. An analytical detour
Under a partial equilibrium framework, the additional revenue coming from monetary compensations would directly translate into an identical increase of domestic economic activity. But, when general equilibrium interactions are taken into account, the impact of monetary compensations becomes less straightforward because of their feedback effect on the terms-of-trade, which causes adjustments on international markets affecting domestic production and labour markets.
This section proposes an analytical framework to isolate the general equilibrium effects of monetary transfers when these three dimensions of interaction are taken into account. The specifications used hereafter in equations (1), (2) and (3) are similar to the ones adopted in the IMACLIM-R for the representation of goods supply, labour markets and international trade (as described by equations (SM-7), (SM-10), (SM-19)-(SM-22) respectively in the Supplementary Material of (Waisman et al, 2012a) ).
Model specifications
We consider an energy-exporting economy, which produces a composite good Q sold at price p and energy E sold at price p E .
The composite good is produced with energy and labour as production factors. Unitary energy and labour requirements for production are defined by e and l, respectively, the wage rate is noted w and a mark-up rate π over production costs captures imperfect competition. The price level is then given by .
..
Labour markets are described by a wage curve introducing an inverse relationship between the wage rate and unemployment. 19 This means that the real wage level is an increasing function of the number of employed workers L lQ = :
Here, w is a constant and 0 α > is the elasticity of the wage curve: the higher α , the more flexible the labour markets.
Finally, the trade balance for the composite good is an increasing function of the price differential between local prices p and world price p w : the higher the local production price (relatively to international levels), the more agents have incentives to rely on imported goods M and to reduce exportations X. For the sake of simplicity; we assume a simplified dependence between the trade balance w p M pX − and relative prices
Here I is a constant and 0 β > is the elasticity of the trade balance to price differentials: the higher β the more the trade balance is sensitive to price variations.
Setting the world price as the numéraire (p w =1), the equilibrium of the balance of payments gives:
Here, K measures (relative) capital exportations and T represents the transfers received for compensation of the adverse impacts of the climate policy.
Results and interpretation
Capital export K is exogenously set (see discussion in section 1.3), and is therefore independent from the level of monetary transfers. Given the small size of transfers with respect to total income in oil-consuming countries (around 0.24% of OECD), we make the additional assumption that energy demand is not altered and hence that energy variables p E
and X E are not affected by the introduction of monetary transfers.
By noting p 0 and Q 0 the price and production levels in absence of monetary compensations, the Laspeyres index of economic activity, which measures GDP levels in quantity units after the introduction of monetary transfers, is defined by:
We introduce the "efficiency index of monetary transfers", T η , as the ratio of GDP variations due to monetary compensation over the amount of transfers: 
Here, three parameters characterizing the domestic economy (in terms of production structures and exposure to international competition) prove to play a crucial role:
• 0 E pe wl ε = the ratio of energy costs to labour costs in production processes
the dependence of the local economy on energy exportations.
• EE K u pX = the relative importance of capital exports to energy exports.
The effect of monetary transfers on ex-post economic activity is stronger, as captured by higher T η , when (i) labor market rigidities are important (low α ) and production processes are energy-intensive (high ε ). Under the assumption of equilibrated balance of payments, the transfers must be compensated by additional exports and hence a gain of competitiveness.
Rigid labor markets mean that these adjustments do not affect significantly real wages and hence households' purchase power, but rather rely on international effects on terms-of-trade. This is even truer in economies where labor represents a moderate share of production costs so that the efforts towards more competitive production processes affects through non-labor inputs; (ii) domestic sectors are less exposed to international trade, as captured by less intense competition on industrial goods (low β ), less dependence on energy exportation revenues (low v ) and high capital exports (high u). In this case indeed, monetary transfers play a minored role in the position of the local economy on international markets. 
The macroeconomy of monetary transfers. A numerical assessment
The analytical study proposed in previous section has permitted to demonstrate that the nature of macroeconomic adjustments, and in particular of market imperfections, importantly affects the consequences of monetary transfers. However, this simplified approach is not sufficient to give a comprehensive overview because it ignores both the dynamic effects (including technical change and learning-by-doing effects) and the structural dimensions (in particular the evolution from energy-intensive to low-carbon industries). To quantify more precisely these effects, we provide here assessments of monetary transfers in the multisectoral and dynamic approach defined by the IMACLIM-R model.
The implementation of monetary transfers alters significantly GDP trajectories in both contributing countries (Figure 8a ) and recipient countries (Figure 8b ). On the one hand, the transfers unsurprisingly increase climate policy costs in OECD but the additional burden remains moderate. Long-term losses in 2050 range from 2% to 2.5% of GDP if transfers are implemented instead of 1% to 2% in absence of transfers (Figure 7a ). On the other hand, the monetary transfers help reducing the transitory costs induced in Middle-East countries down to 7.5% of GDP (in the MF scenario) or 9.5% (in the LD scenario) instead of 12.5% in the benchmark case (Figure 8b ). This assessment confirms that, although the costs are reduced, the monetary transfers do not permit to offset completely the losses because their efficiency is limited by general equilibrium effects. This is confirmed by the quantitative estimates in the first column of Table 3 which feature positive, but significantly lower than one, values of the total efficiency index (0.21 and 0.63 in the LD and MF scenario, respectively). To identify the mechanisms behind these effects, we decompose the efficiency index according to domestic vs. trade activities (Table 3 ). More precisely, we define the domestic efficiency index
η ) by the variations of domestic activity (resp. trade balances) consecutive to the introduction of monetary transfers 
Conclusion
This paper discusses the question of compensation for the adverse impacts of a climate policy in a 'thought' experiment considering monetary transfers schemes and taking Middle-East countries as an example. This exercise helps pointing out mechanisms and orders of magnitude to identify the potentials and intrinsic limits of such approaches of compensation problems. Its major insight is about the impasses of a diplomatic language basing these compensations on observable indicators (here the oil exports) and ignoring the magnitude of the efficiency gap caused by general equilibrium effects.
In a general equilibrium model representing the interactions between oil markets and the macroeconomy, we first show a time-lag between losses of oil exports and of macroeconomic activity measured in GDP. Oil export losses remain moderate in the short term, especially under a 'low deployment strategy' of oil production, while the GDP losses can be very high because Middle-East countries cannot quickly adjust to very high increase of their (currently very low) domestic energy prices. This mismatch explains why compensating transfers based on oil revenue losses cannot solve the transition problem.
But, even fine-tuning compensations according to GDP losses proves to compensate only partly the economic slowdown due to a carbon constraint because of general equilibrium feedbacks which undermine the macroeconomic efficiency of monetary transfers. This 'efficiency gap' of transfers results in particular from the dependence of the domestic output to oil exportation revenues, the sensitivity of non energy sectors to price competition and the labour market rigidities which restrict the adaptive capacity of economies to changing conditions. In addition to this intrinsic limit to the effectiveness of transfers, our results show that the magnitude of the GDP losses to be compensated cannot rely on observable parameters since the magnitude of the efficiency gap of transfers is determined by the strategic choices of the Middle-East and also by the capacity of domestic policies to block Dutch disease mechanisms.
These results show, beyond the specific case of oil exporters, the trap of reducing the compensation problem in climate negotiations to a question of monetary transfers. Other options are to be envisaged like technological transfers (Barrett, 2001 (Barrett, , 2003 or innovative devices in climate finance to ease the structural transition towards low carbon development paths and, in the case of Middle-East countries, towards the "beyond oil" era.
prefer the MF scenario only if their discount rate is lower than 6%.
18 Note that this effect is measured under the assumption that Middle-East governments maintain the current levels of energy subsidies but do not seek to increase it to offset the increase of fuel prices due to the climate policy because it would involve a non-affordable amount for public spending 19 Microeconometric evidence for such formulation was given in a seminal contribution by (Blanchflower and Oswald 1995) and extensive theories have been developed to support such representation of the labour market (see (Layard et al., 2005) for an overview). The basic idea is that high unemployment represents an outside threat that leads workers to accept lower wages as from either the bargaining approach (Layard and Nickell, 1986) or the wage-efficiency approach (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) .
Appendix: analytical resolution of model in Section 4
To simplify notations, we introduce:
the ratio of monetary transfers over total energy exportation revenues, which measures the magnitude of monetary transfers.
• 0 EE pX v GDP = the dependence of the local economy on energy exportations.
• 0 E pe wl ε = the ratio of energy costs to labour costs in production processes.
